Simulation theory: Difference between revisions
No edit summary |
Xinreality (talk | contribs) No edit summary |
||
| (5 intermediate revisions by 2 users not shown) | |||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
==Introduction== | |||
A number of different writers, technologists, and futurologists have predicted that the available computer power in the future will be enormous. Future civilizations may have the capability to create simulations with a high level of detail. These would simulate the universe and its laws, allowing for the emergence of self-conscious entities that could communicate with one another. They could be simulations of that civilization's forebears, and since they would run on very powerful computers, they could run a great many of them <ref name=”1”> Bostrom, N. (2003). Are you living in a computer simulation? Philosophical Quarterly, 53(211): 243-255</ref> <ref name=”2”> Barrow, J. D. (2007). Living in a simulated universe. In Universe or Multiverse? Cambridge University Press, pp. 481-486</ref>. The idea that our universe is a software process running on some deeper computational substrate is known as the Simulation Argument (or Simulation Hypothesis). Nick Bostrom has provided an argument for this thesis, and while other philosophers are taking this idea seriously, physicist suggest that there might be practical ways to find evidence that confirms it <ref name=”3”> Steinhart, E. (2010). Theological Implications of the Simulation Argument. Ars Disputandi, 10(1): 23-37</ref> <ref name=”4”> Jones, A. Z. (2015). Are we living in a computer simulation? Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/blogs/physics/2015/07/are-we-living-in-a-computer-simulation/</ref> <ref name=”5”> Beane, S. R., Davoudi, Z. and Savage, M. J. (2012). Constraints on the universe as a numerical simulation. arXiv:1210.1847v2 [hep-ph]</ref>. | A number of different writers, technologists, and futurologists have predicted that the available computer power in the future will be enormous. Future civilizations may have the capability to create simulations with a high level of detail. These would simulate the universe and its laws, allowing for the emergence of self-conscious entities that could communicate with one another. They could be simulations of that civilization's forebears, and since they would run on very powerful computers, they could run a great many of them <ref name=”1”> Bostrom, N. (2003). Are you living in a computer simulation? Philosophical Quarterly, 53(211): 243-255</ref> <ref name=”2”> Barrow, J. D. (2007). Living in a simulated universe. In Universe or Multiverse? Cambridge University Press, pp. 481-486</ref>. The idea that our universe is a software process running on some deeper computational substrate is known as the Simulation Argument (or Simulation Hypothesis). Nick Bostrom has provided an argument for this thesis, and while other philosophers are taking this idea seriously, physicist suggest that there might be practical ways to find evidence that confirms it <ref name=”3”> Steinhart, E. (2010). Theological Implications of the Simulation Argument. Ars Disputandi, 10(1): 23-37</ref> <ref name=”4”> Jones, A. Z. (2015). Are we living in a computer simulation? Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/blogs/physics/2015/07/are-we-living-in-a-computer-simulation/</ref> <ref name=”5”> Beane, S. R., Davoudi, Z. and Savage, M. J. (2012). Constraints on the universe as a numerical simulation. arXiv:1210.1847v2 [hep-ph]</ref>. | ||
==Simulation argument== | ==Simulation argument== | ||
The philosopher Nick Bostrom (University of Oxford) explored, with rigor, the issue of the simulation argument, for the first time, in a 2003 article. The type of simulations he explored are not akin to the ones in the movie Matrix, for example. In the film, the world was simulated but the conscious minds were not. On the contrary, the simulations explored by Bostrom do not have a biological component, being run on a deeper level hardware or in virtual machines inside other simulations. The argument takes into account the assumption of substrate-independence and the technological limits of computation, and a bland indifference principle <ref name=”1”></ref> <ref name=”4”></ref>. | The philosopher [[Nick Bostrom]] (University of Oxford) explored, with rigor, the issue of the simulation argument, for the first time, in a 2003 article. The type of simulations he explored are not akin to the ones in the movie Matrix, for example. In the film, the world was simulated but the conscious minds were not. On the contrary, the simulations explored by Bostrom do not have a biological component, being run on a deeper level hardware or in virtual machines inside other simulations. The argument takes into account the assumption of substrate-independence and the technological limits of computation, and a bland indifference principle <ref name=”1”></ref> <ref name=”4”></ref>. | ||
===Assumption of substrate-independence=== | ===Assumption of substrate-independence=== | ||
| Line 23: | Line 24: | ||
===The core argument=== | ===The core argument=== | ||
The core of the simulation argument does not try do demonstrate that reality is, in fact, a simulation. It merely shows that one of three propositions should be accepted as true <ref name=”1”></ref> <ref name=”3”></ref>. The general idea can be understood without mathematics, although a formal version of the argument uses probability theory <ref name=”7”> Bostrom, N. (2006). Do we live in a computer simulation? New Scientist, 192(2579): 38-39</ref>. Although each of the propositions may seem implausible, if the simulation argument is correct, at least one is true <ref name=”6”></ref>. According to Bostrom (2003, 2006), the three | The core of the simulation argument does not try do demonstrate that reality is, in fact, a simulation. It merely shows that one of three propositions should be accepted as true <ref name=”1”></ref> <ref name=”3”></ref>. The general idea can be understood without mathematics, although a formal version of the argument uses probability theory <ref name=”7”> Bostrom, N. (2006). Do we live in a computer simulation? New Scientist, 192(2579): 38-39</ref>. Although each of the propositions may seem implausible, if the simulation argument is correct, at least one is true <ref name=”6”></ref>. According to Bostrom (2003, 2006), the three propositions presented are: | ||
| Line 49: | Line 50: | ||
==Implications of living in a simulation== | ==Implications of living in a simulation== | ||
It is possible that if we are living in a simulation there would be no way to identify it. The virtual reality would seem completely real. Even so, we could never be certain that we would not be living in a virtual reality <ref name=”6”></ref>. However, some researchers have suggested that simulations may have limits | It is possible that if we are living in a simulation there would be no way to identify it. The virtual reality would seem completely real. Even so, we could never be certain that we would not be living in a virtual reality <ref name=”6”></ref>. However, some researchers have suggested that simulations may have limits - that even posthuman simulators with advanced knowledge of the laws of nature would still not have a complete knowledge of them. These flaws would be subtle but could result in glitches in the simulation. Another possibility is that the simulators would try to fix these flaws by patching the virtual reality. These updates could result in changes to the laws of nature, over time. Living in a simulated reality would mean that occasional glitches would occur, along with small drifts in the constants and laws of Nature <ref name=”2”></ref> <ref name=”4”></ref>. | ||
A study published in the journal ArXiv, in 2012, suggests that there is always the possibility for the simulated to discover the simulators, and offers the prediction that there might be limitations on cosmic ray energy levels if reality is indeed a simulation. Furthermore, it predicts that the reason for the posthuman civilization to run simulations is to test out string theory. Detailed simulations could allow for future researchers to test hypotheses about the universe and disprove a number of possible different versions of string theory <ref name=”4”></ref> <ref name=”5”></ref>. This would give credence to the suggestion that the posthumans have an incomplete knowledge about the laws of physics, and therefore it is expected that there would be gaps and flaws in their simulations <ref name=”2”></ref> <ref name=”4”></ref>. | A study published in the journal ArXiv, in 2012, suggests that there is always the possibility for the simulated to discover the simulators, and offers the prediction that there might be limitations on cosmic ray energy levels if reality is indeed a simulation. Furthermore, it predicts that the reason for the posthuman civilization to run simulations is to test out string theory. Detailed simulations could allow for future researchers to test hypotheses about the universe and disprove a number of possible different versions of string theory <ref name=”4”></ref> <ref name=”5”></ref>. This would give credence to the suggestion that the posthumans have an incomplete knowledge about the laws of physics, and therefore it is expected that there would be gaps and flaws in their simulations <ref name=”2”></ref> <ref name=”4”></ref>. | ||
It is expectable for the simulators to be economical and practical in their simulated realities if they were for entertainment, for example. They could avoid the complexity of using a consistent set of laws of Nature, patching instead “realistic” effects. These could cause some problems and be identifiable from within the simulation. Another cause for sudden glitches in the simulated realities could be the use of error-correcting codes. This is a technique that has been effective in the simulation of complex systems. These codes would correct mistakes in the simulation much like the error correcting system that exists in DNA. If the genetic system did not have a correcting mechanism, it would eventually be corrupted by the build-up of mutations. The computer equivalent of this system also guards against error accumulation. The use of error-correction codes could lead, once in a while, for a correction to take place, leading to sudden changes that would appear to contravene the laws of nature present in the simulation. Finally, the simulations would have a similar level of computational complexity, in which “the simulated creatures should have a similar complexity to the most complex simulated non-living structures.” <ref name=”2”></ref> | It is expectable for the simulators to be economical and practical in their simulated realities if they were for entertainment, for example. They could avoid the complexity of using a consistent set of laws of Nature, patching instead “realistic” effects. These could cause some problems and be identifiable from within the simulation. Another cause for sudden glitches in the simulated realities could be the use of error-correcting codes. This is a technique that has been effective in the simulation of complex systems. These codes would correct mistakes in the simulation much like the error correcting system that exists in DNA. If the genetic system did not have a correcting mechanism, it would eventually be corrupted by the build-up of mutations. The computer equivalent of this system also guards against error accumulation. The use of error-correction codes could lead, once in a while, for a correction to take place, leading to sudden changes that would appear to contravene the laws of nature present in the simulation. Finally, the simulations would have a similar level of computational complexity, in which “the simulated creatures should have a similar complexity to the most complex simulated non-living structures.” <ref name=”2”></ref> | ||
There is also the question of how can we trust the observations made about reality if it is a simulation. The simulation argument relies on the assumption of the technological capabilities of a posthuman civilization, and the evidence for that assumption is empirical, based on the current best theories about the physical limits of computation. Ultimately, these observations of the world around us could be misleading, providing data about the simulated reality and not about the underlying reality in which the simulation is running. However, according to Bostrom, “the claim that we cannot have any information about the underlying reality if we are in a simulation is false.” He provides two conditional claims that can be know if reality is a simulation. These are adapted from the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) page available in the website [http://www.simulation-argument.com www.simulation-argument.com] <ref name=”9”> Bostrom, N. (2008). The simulation argument FAQ. Retrieved from http://www.simulation-argument.com/faq.html</ref>: | There is also the question of how can we trust the observations made about reality if it is a simulation. The simulation argument relies on the assumption of the technological capabilities of a posthuman civilization, and the evidence for that assumption is empirical, based on the current best theories about the physical limits of computation. Ultimately, these observations of the world around us could be misleading, providing data about the simulated reality and not about the underlying reality in which the simulation is running. However, according to Bostrom, “the claim that we cannot have any information about the underlying reality if we are in a simulation is false.” He provides two conditional claims that can be know if reality is a simulation. These are adapted from the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) page available in the website [http://www.simulation-argument.com www.simulation-argument.com] <ref name=”9”> Bostrom, N. (2008). The simulation argument FAQ. Retrieved from http://www.simulation-argument.com/faq.html</ref>: | ||
'''1.''' If we are in a simulation, then the underlying reality is such as to permit simulations, it contains at least one such simulation, and (3) (the third proposition of the argument) is true. | '''1.''' If we are in a simulation, then the underlying reality is such as to permit simulations, it contains at least one such simulation, and (3) (the third proposition of the argument) is true. | ||
'''2.''' If we are not in a simulation, then the empirical evidence noted in the simulation argument is veridical taken at face value, suggesting that a technologically mature civilization would have the ability to create vast number of simulations; and consequently, by the simulation argument, there is a very high probability at least one of the disjuncts in (1)-(3) is true <ref name=”9”></ref>. | |||
A technological mature civilization could run a vast number of simulations since it is expected that it would have enough computer power available. If our reality is a simulation then there are probably a myriad of other simulations, differing in some detail or overall design. These may run sequentially or simultaneously. A simulation can have a civilization that reaches the posthuman stage and proceeds to build its own virtual realities. In this way, reality could have many levels, with simulations within simulations running on virtual computers. The number of layers of simulation would be dependent on the computer power available at the base-level computer (which is not simulated) <ref name=”1”></ref> <ref name=”6”></ref> <ref name=”8”></ref>. | |||
The posthuman simulators can, in some ways, be considered to be like gods to the beings inhabiting the simulation: 1) they created the virtual world; 2) they have a superior intellect; 3) they can interfere in the everyday world, violating its physical laws (omnipotent); and they can monitor everything that happens (omniscient) <ref name=”1”></ref>. Indeed, the simulation argument has theological implications, and some have considered it as an interesting argument for the existence of God <ref name=”3”></ref>. | |||
If it is plausible that there can be simulations within simulation then in each deeper level the physical power of the computers increase, as well as the intelligences of their respective civilizations. If there is an infinitely deep computer then God could be viewed as functionally equivalent to that infinitely self-programming computer, being pure hardware and not software running in another simulation. The designer of the universe would not be God, in this case, but the deeper level civilization. God - being the base hardware in which all other simulation ran - could be considered the ground of being. It would support an infinite hierarchy of simulators that would produce their own virtual realities. An afterlife would also be viable in this hierarchical system of simulations. Simulated beings could be resurrected many times, moving to deeper level simulations and getting closer to the base-level world in which the base computer runs (something analogous to moving closer to God) <ref name=”3”></ref>. | |||
Finally, other thinkers have explored the question of natural evil in a world created by a benevolent creator god, in view of the simulation argument. According to Johnson (2011), “if we grant the theist the knowledge of God’s existence that they claim, the problem of natural evil forces the theist to choose between rejecting “God designed our universe” and “natural disasters are evil.” We have much more reason to reject the former than the latter and, if Bostrom is right, our being in a computer simulation is the best non-divine explanation for our universe’s design.” <ref> Johnson, D. K. (2011). Natural evil and the simulation hypothesis. Philo, Vol. 14(2)</ref> | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
<references /> | |||
[[Category:Terms]] | |||