I-O Display Systems: Difference between revisions
Xinreality (talk | contribs) No edit summary |
Xinreality (talk | contribs) No edit summary |
||
| (3 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown) | |||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{Company Infobox | {{Company Infobox | ||
|image=[[File:i- | |image=[[File:i-glasses2.jpg|350px]] | ||
|Type= Private | |Type= Private | ||
|Industry= [[Virtual Reality]], [[Personal Display Systems]], [[Stereoscopic 3D]] products | |Industry= [[Virtual Reality]], [[Personal Display Systems]], [[Stereoscopic 3D]] products | ||
| Line 24: | Line 24: | ||
===Bankruptcy and Closure (1997)=== | ===Bankruptcy and Closure (1997)=== | ||
Despite gaining market share in the emerging VR headset market, the company faced financial difficulties as consumer VR adoption grew slower than anticipated. Co-founders Amadon and Rhoads resigned in January 1997, and Virtual i·O filed for Chapter 11 protection on March 14, reporting US$9.7 million in assets against US$21.6 million in | Despite gaining market share in the emerging VR headset market, the company faced financial difficulties as consumer VR adoption grew slower than anticipated. Co-founders Amadon and Rhoads resigned in January 1997, and Virtual i·O filed for Chapter 11 protection on March 14, reporting US$9.7 million in assets against US$21.6 million in liabilities-most owed to TCI and Thomson SA.<ref name="PSBJMar97"/> | ||
Annual headset returns peaked at 30 percent owing to fragile cables and dust ingress,<ref name="Tampa97">"Reality has not lived up to the promise for virtual‑reality games", Tampa Bay Times, 28 Sep 1997, https://www.tampabay.com/archive/1997/09/28/reality-has-not-lived-up-to-the-promise-for-virtual-reality-games/</ref> further complicating the company's financial position. A court-appointed turnaround team failed to secure a buyer, and operations ceased on April 30, 1997; the remaining assets reverted to TCI the following month.<ref name="PSBJMay97"/> | Annual headset returns peaked at 30 percent owing to fragile cables and dust ingress,<ref name="Tampa97">"Reality has not lived up to the promise for virtual‑reality games", Tampa Bay Times, 28 Sep 1997, https://www.tampabay.com/archive/1997/09/28/reality-has-not-lived-up-to-the-promise-for-virtual-reality-games/</ref> further complicating the company's financial position. A court-appointed turnaround team failed to secure a buyer, and operations ceased on April 30, 1997; the remaining assets reverted to TCI the following month.<ref name="PSBJMay97"/> | ||
| Line 103: | Line 103: | ||
Early press coverage praised the light weight (227g) and competitive price compared with the Sony Glasstron, yet criticized visible pixelation and limited software support.<ref name="Wired99">"Little Big Screen", Wired, 1 Aug 1999, https://www.wired.com/1999/08/little-big-screen</ref> Analysts at TWICE magazine cited insufficient in-store demonstrations and fragile demo units as key barriers to mainstream adoption.<ref name="PSBJMay97"/> | Early press coverage praised the light weight (227g) and competitive price compared with the Sony Glasstron, yet criticized visible pixelation and limited software support.<ref name="Wired99">"Little Big Screen", Wired, 1 Aug 1999, https://www.wired.com/1999/08/little-big-screen</ref> Analysts at TWICE magazine cited insufficient in-store demonstrations and fragile demo units as key barriers to mainstream adoption.<ref name="PSBJMay97"/> | ||
By late 1996, the company was shipping roughly 300 units per month, with professional and medical buyers representing 25 percent of volume.<ref name="3DOWorld"/> Despite modest early | By late 1996, the company was shipping roughly 300 units per month, with professional and medical buyers representing 25 percent of volume.<ref name="3DOWorld"/> Despite modest early sales-about 30,000 units went to U.S. dentists alone for chair-side "patient distraction" video<ref name="Wired99"/>-revenue fell short of projections, contributing to the company's financial difficulties. | ||
==Legacy== | ==Legacy== | ||